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Comment
The New York Courts' Lack of Direction
and Discretion Regarding the Admissibility
of Expert Identification Testimony
I. Introduction
Through innocent eyes, there must be nothing more terri-
fying than having an eyewitness respond to the prosecutor's re-
quest to indicate the perpetrator of the crime by pointing
directly at you. Yet, these misidentifications happen quite often
and result in a majority of the miscarriages of justice in our
court systems.' Certainly since the Sacco and Vanzetti case,2
lawyers and judges have struggled to solve the problem of mis-
1. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228 (1967) ("[Tlhe annals of criminal
law are rife with instances of mistaken identification."); Bennett L. Gershman, The
Thin Blue Line: Art or Trial in the Fact-Finding Process?, 9 PACE L. REV. 275, 306
n.107 (1989) (citing C. Ronald Huff et al., Guilty Until Proved Innocent: Wrongful
Conviction and Public Policy, 32 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 518, 524 (1986))
("[Ejyewitness misidentification is the single most important factor leading to con-
viction."); see, e.g., State v. Adams, No. F-77-1286-I (Crim. Dist. Ct., No. 2, Dallas
County), affd, 577 S.W.2d 717 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979), rev'd sub nom. Adams v.
Texas, 448 U.S. 38 (1980), on remand, 624 S.W.2d 568 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981),
habeas corpus granted, Ex parte Adams, 768 S.W.2d 281 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989)
(vacating murder conviction due to much doubt as to defendant's guilt and illegal
action on the part of prosecutor); People v. Dabbs, 154 Misc. 2d 671, 587 N.Y.S.2d
90 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1991) (vacating rape conviction when DNA analy-
sis of physical evidence made nine years after rape indicated that the defendant
was not the perpetrator even though the victim had identified the defendant as the
rapist, claiming that she knew him and was certain of the identification).
2. Commonwealth v. Sacco, 151 N.E. 839 (Mass. 1926) (finding the two de-
fendants, Nicola Sacco and Bartolomeo Vanzetti, guilty of murder). The trial was
filled with fabrication and knowing falsity because of the defendants' Italian-
American immigrant status and their anarchist views. David Starkman, The Use
of Eyewitness Identification Evidence in Criminal Trials, 21 CRIM. L. Q. 361, 365
(1979). One witness testified to seeing the two perpetrators in a car driving by her
some 60 to 80 feet away for a brief time, yet she made an extremely accurate iden-
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identification.3 However, common misconceptions 4 and igno-
rance about the identification process allow the problem to
persist, notwithstanding constitutional guarantees 5 and proper
police practice. 6 The remaining protection against the danger of
judicial miscarriage due to misidentification is courtroom edu-
cation. This education is one that only an expert can ade-
quately provide.
Years of studies into the human mind's ability to perceive a
visual image, retain it, and finally retrieve it upon recollection
have revealed many counterintuitive results.7 Applied to iden-
tification testimony at trial, these results reveal the probability
of juror misconception in the courtroom. An expert in the field
of memory and perception could dispel some of the common mis-
conceptions if permitted to testify in a criminal proceeding re-
garding the reliability of the identification process.8
The New York courts have been reluctant to come to terms
with this increasingly accepted area of science.9 This reluctance
was highlighted by the Court of Appeals' summary decision re-
garding expert identification testimony in People v. Mooney. 10
Under the guise of discretion, New York courts have frequently
found various inconsistent reasons for excluding this type of ex-
pert identification testimony offered on the defendant's behalf."
Additionally, there seems to be an apparent discretionary ineq-
uity that exists between decisions involving the admissibility of
tification of both which "border[ed] on the incredible [under] the circumstances."
Id.
3. See infra notes 79-82 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 73-78 and accompanying text.
5. Such as due process and the right to counsel. U.S. CONST. amends. V and
VI.
6. Such as the elimination of suggestiveness in line-ups. See infra note 79.
7. See infra notes 14-78 and accompanying text.
8. Starkman, supra note 2, at 377 ("Expert testimony concerning the inherent
unreliability of eyewitness identification evidence may prove to be the only effec-
tive method of alerting jurors to the inherent weakness of this sort of evidence
9. James J. Brosnahan & Carl H. Loewenson, Jr., Expert Testimony Concern-
ing Eyewitness Identification, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 19, 1993, at 1 ("New York appellate
decisions condemn this [expert] testimony virtually without exception .... "); see
infra notes 133-85 and accompanying text.
10. 76 N.Y.2d 827, 559 N.E.2d 1274, 560 N.Y.S.2d 115 (1990); see infra notes
235-48 and accompanying text.
11. See discussion infra part II.C.
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psychological expert testimony for the prosecution and that for
the defense. 12
This Comment describes the uncertainty involving the ad-
mission of expert identification testimony in New York State
courts and analyzes the main arguments against its admissibil-
ity. Part II.A. of this Comment summarizes the extensive body
of research that has developed over the years in the area of
memory and perception. Part II.B. highlights the background
federal and state law regarding the admissibility of both gen-
eral scientific expert testimony and psychological expert testi-
mony in the area of memory and perception, or expert
identification testimony. Part II.C. presents the New York
courts' handling of the admissibility question and the apparent
effect of the only Court of Appeals opinion to deal with expert
identification testimony.'3 Part III provides an analysis of the
New York courts' discretionary decisions in this area and how
they compare to the courts' decisions involving psychological ex-
pert testimony proffered by prosecutors. Part IV concludes that
the New York courts' treatment of admissibility issues in this
area is inconsistent with its rich history of providing full rights
to defendants and suggests that the Court of Appeals reconsider
its muteness on the subject in light of recent developments.
II. Background
A. The Studies
Psychological research studies over the last twenty years or
so have produced interesting results concerning the human
memory process and how it is affected by outside stimuli.' 4
These experiments constitute a large body of research that can
be drawn upon by expert witnesses in criminal cases.' 5 The en-
tire area of science is complex and often well beyond the layper-
son's common understanding. Thus, the results are often
counterintuitive, revealing the likelihood of public
misconception.
12. See discussion infra part III.B.
13. Mooney, 76 N.Y.2d 827, 559 N.E.2d 1274, 560 N.Y.S.2d 115.
14. See infra notes 16-72 and accompanying text.
15. ELIZABETH F. LoFrus & JAMEs M. DOYLE, EYEwITNEss TESTIMONY: CwiL
AND CRIMINAL 277-318 (1987).
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1. The Memory Process
Comparing human memory to a camera or videotape
machine is a faulty analogy. 16 The human mind does not simply
take in all toward which the eyes are pointed and, unlike the
camera, the eyes may not perceive all that they see.17 Addition-
ally, the videotape system does not interpret what it shoots like
the mind does.18 The videotape has no expectations or inter-
ests.19 The videotape cartridge can be stored in a safe place for
years without affecting the contents. However, memory gener-
ally fades as time passes and is often "supplemented" by infer-
ences while in storage.20 Finally, to see the tape, one need only
play it back. The mind's ability to retrieve accurate information
from memory depends on many factors. 21 We cannot simply
play it back.
a. Perception
Many factors affect a person's ability to perceive an object
or event. The factors can be divided into those which are inher-
ent in the outside circumstances surrounding the event itself
(event factors) and those which are inherent in the perceiver
(witness factors).22
Event factors include lighting conditions, event duration,
and violence of the event.23 While it may seem obvious that bet-
ter lighting probably results in more accurate perception, the
relationship between perception and lighting is more complex
than most would think. 24 Observations made after sudden
changes in lighting often present special problems at the level of
the eye's retina.25 However, even generally good viewing condi-
tions such as constant lighting only allow for accurate percep-
16. GARY L. WELLS, EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION 1 (1988).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. See infra notes 22-63 and accompanying text.
22. LoFTus & DOYLE, supra note 15, at 32-33.
23. Id. at 33-47.
24. Id. at 33.
25. Id. at 34-36 (explaining that receptor cells, called rods and cones, take
time to recover from shifts in lighting levels).
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tion if other factors, such as stress and expectation, 26 do not
interfere.27
People generally overestimate the time duration of
events.28 Studies have shown that, depending upon the stress
and complexity of the event, the overestimation varies substan-
tially.29 While the longer the duration of an event, the more ac-
curate the perception of that event, it is less clear whether the
subject remembers how long the event actually lasted.30
Finally, people are generally less capable of accurate per-
ception of a violent event. 31 Violent events adversely affect not
only the perception of the event itself, but details preceding the
event as well.32 Studies have shown that a "retrograde amne-
sia" of earlier events can occur after the viewing of a violent
event. 3 Memory may also be impeded in the traumatic or emo-
tional event because the viewer's attention is narrowed in these
instances. 34
The other factors that affect perception are those involving
the viewer, or witness factors. One of these factors is the wit-
26. See infra notes 28-63 and accompanying text.
27. WELLS, supra note 16, at 20; see, e.g., A. Daniel Yarmey, Verbal, Visual,
and Voice Identification of a Rape Suspect Under Different Levels of Illumination,
71 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 363, 368 (1986) (revealing difficulties in accurate identifi-
cation of suspect even in bright lighting).
28. LoFrus & DOYLE, supra note 15, at 37.
29. Id. at 37-38 (citing JAMES MARSHALL, LAW AND PSYCHOLOGY IN CONFLICT
41-81 (1966) (viewers, on average, estimated a 42 second film in which man rocks a
baby carriage and then flees when a woman approaches to last a minute and a
half); Elizabeth F. Loftus et al., Time Went By So Slowly: Overestimation of Event
Duration by Males and Females, 1 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 36, 10 (1987) (av-
erage estimate of duration of 30 second simulated bank robbery was 152 seconds
and the higher stress version of the robbery resulted in longer estimates)).
30. Id. at 36-37.
31. Id. at 43 (citing Brian R. Clifford & Clive R. Hollin, Effects of the Type of
Incident and the Number of Perpetrators on Eyewitness Memory, 66 J. APPLIED
PSYCHOL. 364 (1981) (subjects who viewed videotapes of different versions of an
event showed a decreased accuracy in both testimony and identification as the vio-
lence of the witnessed event increased)).
32. Id. at 43-47.
33. Id. at 44 (citing Elizabeth F. Loftus & Terrence E. Burns, Mental Shock
Can Produce Retrograde Amnesia, 10 MEMORY & COGNITION 318 (1982) (subjects
who viewed mentally shocking event (a young boy violently shot in the face) at the
end of a film showed poorer perception of earlier details of film)).
34. Id. at 46 (citing J.A. Easterbrook, The Effect of Emotion on Cue Utilization
and the Organization of Behavior, 66 PSYCHOL. REV. 183 (1959)).
1105
5
PACE LAW REVIEW
ness's stress level.3 5 While violent events have their own influ-
ence on perception, depending on the individual, the stress
caused by the event can affect memory to an even greater ex-
tent.36 The effect of stress on the efficiency of an individual's
perception is demonstrated by the Yerkes-Dodson Law.37 The
law provides that, as the level of stress initially increases, the
ability to accurately perceive also increases. 38 However, when
the stress level gets too high, the efficiency of memory declines
dramatically. 39 Studies have shown that simulated dangerous
situations bring about an anxiety level that hinders the sub-
ject's ability to remember or follow detailed instructions. 40
Another witness factor involves a phenomenon called
weapon focus. 41 Weapon focus is the term used to describe a
crime witness's tendency to concentrate on the weapon used by
the assailant.42 This focusing results in a reduced ability to re-
call other details of the event.43 Studies have revealed that
weapon focus, perhaps along with the anxiety caused by the
event, results in a greater recollection of the weapon and a de-
creased recollection of the other surrounding images, including
the identity of the person bearing the weapon. 44 However, this
phenomenon of weapon focus seems to apply even in nonstress-
ful situations. 45
35. Id. at 47.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 48. Yerkes and Dodson were two psychologists who discovered the
theory underlying this law in 1908. Id.
38. Id. at 48-49.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 50 (citing Mitchell M. Berkun et al., Experimental Studies of Psycho-
logical Stress In Man, 76 PSYCHOLOGICAL MONOGRAPHS (unpaginated) (1962)
(army recruits failed to remember how to repair radios after they had been told
that they were being mistakenly shelled with live ammunition)).
41. Id. at 51.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 51-52. One study compared the recollection of subjects who viewed
two versions of an event showing a customer on line in a cafeteria. Id. at 52. One
version had the customer pull a gun on the cashier and the cashier return some
money. The other version had the customer hand the cashier a check in return for
money. Recorded eye movements revealed that the subjects who viewed the
"weapon" version clearly focused on the gun and suffered from poorer memory
than the subjects who viewed the other version. Id.
45. Id. at 52 (citing Elizabeth F. Loftus et al., Some Facts About "Weapon Fo-
cus", 11 L. & HUM. BEHAv. 55 (1987)).
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Expectations of the witness can also greatly affect the per-
ception of an event.46 Studies indicate that depending on the
prior expectation of the viewer, his recollection of what occurred
in the witnessed event varies substantially.47 Guy M. Whipple,
a noted psychologist, commented that "observation is peculiarly
influenced by expectation, so that errors amounting to distinct
illusions or hallucinations may arise from this source .... We
tend to see and hear what we expect to see and hear."48 Expec-
tations that influence perception, studies show, can come from
cultural bias,49 past experience, 50 or personal prejudice. 51 In
any case, the expectation of the witness cannot be ignored in
judging the accuracy of her perception.
b. Retention
Once information has been perceived, the ability to retain it
becomes crucial to the memory process. Forgetting can be
caused by several factors. Studies have revealed that, while the
measure of forgetting may differ depending on the individual,
everyone's memory clearly fades as time elapses since the per-
ceived event. 52 Another instance of forgetting is when the mem-
46. Id. at 54.
47. Id. (citing M.A. Peterson, Witnesses: Memory of Social Events (1976) (un-
published Ph.D. dissertation, University of California (Los Angeles)) (viewers pro-
vided with two different explanations for the motives of actors they were about to
see on same videotape recalled details consistent with their respective explana-
tions)); see infra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
48. ELIZABETH F. LOFTUS, EYEwrrNEss TESTIMONY 37 (1979) (citing Guy M.
Whipple, The Obtaining of Information: Psychology of Observation and Report, 15
PSYCHOL. BULL. 218, 228 (1918)).
49. Id. at 37-38 (citing GORDON W. ALLPORT & LEO POSTMAN, THE PSYCHOL-
OGY OF RUMOR 70-72 (1947) (subjects revealed an unthinking cultural stereotype
that the black man pictured in the scene was hot-tempered and prone to using
weapons)).
50. Id. at 39-40 (citing Jerome S. Bruner & Leo Postman, On the Perception of
Incongruity: A Paradigm, 18 J. OF PERSONALITY 206 (1949) (study revealed that
subjects claimed that they saw only three aces of spades when they were actually
shown five, three in traditional black color and two colored red)).
51. Id. at 40-42 (citing Albert H. Hastorf & Hadley Cantrill, They Saw a
Game: A Case Study, 49 J. OF ABNORMAL AND Soc. PSYCHOL. 129 (1954) (study
revealed vastly different versions of a football game by students of rival schools)).
52. LoFTus & DOYLE, supra note 15, at 70-73 (citing HERMANN EBBINGHAUS,
MEMORY: A CONTRIBUTION TO EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY (1964) (intricate study of
memory and of memory loss as time elapses); Harry P. Bahrick, Memory For Peo-
ple, in EVERYDAY MEMORY ACTIONS AND ABSENT-MINDEDNESS 19 (1983) (accuracy of
recognition by professor of students' faces dropped from 69% two weeks after class
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ory system does not store the information when it is perceived
due to a lack of adequate attention.53 Here, the information is
lost in seconds. 54 However, even when the attention and per-
ception of an event are apparently substantial, individuals are
often unable to remember it after they have perceived further
events.5
5
Information perceived subsequent to an earlier perception
can affect or "interfere" with the retention of the earlier infor-
mation.56 Witnesses of an event can receive this "interference"
by talking to others, hearing questions posed to them about the
event, or reading media accounts of the event.57 Studies indi-
cate that merely mentioning nonexistent objects to the witness
of an event can introduce that object into their recollection. 58
While psychologists differ as to why postevent information
affects memory of an event, research indicates that the memory
apparently retained is clearly modified by postevent
information. 59
c. Retrieval
The individual's ability to accurately retrieve information
from memory once it has been perceived, stored, and retained
greatly depends upon the manner in which the information is
elicited. 60 Research has shown that the best way to obtain accu-
rate information is to allow the individual to report the event
freely. 61 This method is the most accurate because the wording
ended to 31% four years later); Roger N. Shepard, Recognition Memory for Words,
Sentences and Pictures, 6 J. VERBAL LEARNING & VERBAL BEHAV. 156, 158 (1967)
(clerical workers recognition of pictures fell from almost 100% correct after two-
hours to only 57% correct after a four month period)).
53. Id. at 73.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 74.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 78.
58. LoFTus, supra note 48, at 58-62 (1979) (citing several experiments show-
ing that suggestive questioning and inaccurate information can become incorpo-
rated into the witnesses' memories when the information was nonexistent in the
film or scene).
59. LoFTus & DOYLE, supra note 15, at 79-80.
60. Id. at 86.
61. Id. (citing Jack P. Lipton, On the Psychology of Eyewitness Testimony, 62
J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 90 (1977)).
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of a question can influence the individual's response.6 2 Thus,
researchers have concluded that it is best to allow the individ-
ual to tell his story and then, with careful questions, fill in the
gaps.63
2. Face Recognition
While most people do not have much trouble picking out
the face of a friend in a crowd, several phenomena create
problems with identifying strangers. 4 Two phenomena that
fall in this category are cross-racial identification and uncon-
scious transference.
People of one race have greater difficulty recognizing and
identifying persons of races different from their own.65 Re-
search has proven this to be more than a myth.66 Members of
one race also find face reconstruction of subjects from other
races to be difficult.67 Possible explanations of these effects in-
clude differing background and experience of the races,
prejudices toward members of other races, and differing man-
ners in which faces are processed.68 Regardless of the theory,
cross-racial identifications involve undertones of racism that
may be difficult to communicate to others without discomfort. 69
Unconscious transference is a "phenomenon in which a per-
son seen in one situation is confused with or recalled as a per-
son seen in a second situation."70 For example, a ticket agent
may incorrectly recognize a sailor in a line-up as the person who
62. Id. at 87 (asking "How fast were the cars going when they smashed into
each other?" will result in higher estimates than the question, "How fast were the
cars going when they hit each other?").
63. Id. at 86.
64. Id. at 98.
65. Id. at 105.
66. Id. (citing Roy S. Malpass & Jerome Kravits, Recognition for Faces of Own
and Other Race, 13 J. PERSONALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL. 330 (1969)) ("most widely
cited study" in this area that used subjects from predominantly white University of
Illinois and predominantly black Howard University revealed that white students
made two to three times as many false identifications of black students as white
students).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 106-07.
69. It is not easy to imagine a jury, deliberating over a case involving a cross-
racial identification, comfortably discussing the possibility of a misidentification
caused by the difference between the defendant's and the witness's races.
70. LoFrus & DOYLE, supra note 15, at 108.
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robbed him at gunpoint because the sailor had bought tickets
three times before the robbery. 71 While this phenomenon has
been documented in research studies,72 its cause is not under-
stood. In any event, unconscious transference must be taken
into consideration as a possible factor in an eyewitness
identification.
3. Misconception
The foregoing research results indicate that an individual
untrained in the field of memory and perception is bound to
misconceive much of the identification process. A major miscon-
ception by laypersons is that eyewitness confidence corresponds
directly with identification accuracy.7 3 Researchers in this area
agree that "there is little or no relationship between eyewitness
identification accuracy and eyewitness confidence." 74 In fact, a
compilation of studies indicated that only thirteen out of thirty-
one experiments revealed a significant relationship between
confidence and accuracy. 75
The lack of a direct relationship between eyewitness confi-
dence and identification accuracy is due to the fact that each is
caused by different factors.7 6 Identification accuracy is deter-
mined by factors affecting memory and perception, 77 while eye-
witness confidence is determined by social and personality
traits of the witness, independent of the event itself.78 There-
fore, to conclude that a confident eyewitness is an accurate one
is clearly a misconception.
71. Id. (citing PATRICK M. WALL, EyE-WiTNEss IDENTIFICATION IN CRIMINAL
CASES 119-20 (1965)).
72. See LOFTUS, supra note 48, at 142-44 (citing several studies on this
subject).
73. WELLS, supra note 16, at 15.
74. Id. (citing A. Daniel Yarmey & Hazel P. Tressillian Jones, Is the Study of
Eyewitness Identification a Matter of Common Sense?, in EVALUATING WITNESS Ev-
IDENCE (Salley M.A. Lloyd-Bostock & Brian R. Clifford eds., 1983)).
75. Id. (citing Gary L. Wells & D.M. Murray, Eyewitness Confidence, in EYE.
WITNESS TESTIMONY: PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 155-70 (Gary L. Wells & Eliza-
beth F. Loftus eds., 1984).
76. Id.
77. Id; see supra notes 16-72 and accompanying text.
78. Id.
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B. The Law
As this body of research in the field of memory and percep-
tion grew, defense lawyers began to look to "eyewitness identifi-
cation" experts as witnesses. However, because the practice
involves considerations traditionally thought to be satisfied by
other trial procedure techniques, the expert testimony in this
area was only grudgingly embraced until recently. The follow-
ing portion of this Comment tracks the law's development in
this area. Subpart one explains the courts' awareness of the
problem of misidentification. Subpart two discusses how the
general standard of admissibility for scientific expert witnesses
has developed. Finally, subpart three addresses the devel-op-
ment of the courts' acceptance of expert identification
testimony.
1. Recognizing the Problem
In the 1960s, the United States Supreme Court recognized
the dangers of eyewitness identification and imposed safe-
guards to protect the defendant against unconstitutional gov-
ernment action associated with the problem. 79 Although more
recently, in Manson v. Brathwaite,80 the Court limited these
procedural protections by admitting eyewitness identification
evidence even if the procedures used suffered from suggestive-
ness, 81 the essential safeguards developed ten years earlier re-
mained intact. However, courts realized that these protections
were unsatisfactory when government or police procedures
were not a cause of the mistaken identification. 82 Thus, an in-
79. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (holding that the presence of
counsel for the defendant is required at all pretrial line-ups and show-ups). In
Wade, the Court stated that "[tihe vagaries of eyewitness identification are well
known; the annals of criminal law are rife with instances of mistaken identifica-
tion." Id. at 228; see also Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967) (holding that
the admission of evidence of a pretrial line-up without counsel where no showing
was made of an independent basis for identification required a new trial); Stovall
v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967) (stating that unnecessarily suggestive police proce-
dures may violate due process).
80. 432 U.S. 98 (1977).
81. Id. at 104, 114 (holding that if, under the 'totality of the circumstances,"
the identification is reliable, it is admissible).
82. Lovrus, supra note 48, at 180 (the Supreme Court decisions "apply only to
those crimes where the police had to establish the identity of the perpetrator by
means of a photo identification, a showup... or a lineup .. ").
IIII
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creasing number of courts began to permit expert witnesses to
testify to the general dangers of eyewitness unreliability.8 3
2. Admissibility Standard for Scientific Expert
Testimony
Depending on the court, the standard for expert witness ad-
missibility varies.84 Some courts require that the expert's sub-
ject matter be "beyond the ken of laymen," while others permit
the testimony if it would aid the fact-finder's understanding of
the facts.8 5 When faced with a proffer of scientific expert testi-
mony, however, many courts, before 1993, utilized special rules
for admissibility.8 6
a. Federal Courts
Before 1993, the federal law regarding the admissibility of
expert psychological testimony 87 was not clear. Two tests for
the admissibility of scientific or technical expert testimony
seemed to be utilized. The first test was derived from Frye v.
United States.88 The Frye court held that expert testimony con-
cerning scientific subject matter may be admitted only after it
has "gained general acceptance in the particular field in which
it belongs."8 9 Applying this "general acceptance" test, the court
excluded polygraph evidence from an early "deception test."90
The second, more liberal test followed Professor Charles
McCormick's view that "[a]ny relevant conclusions supported by
a qualified expert witness should be received unless there are
83. See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 786 F.2d 1308 (5th Cir. 1986) (modem
inclination toward admissibility of expert identification testimony); United States
v. Langford, 802 F.2d 1176, 1183 (9th Cir. 1986) (Ferguson, J., dissenting) (trend
toward admissibility exists in state and federal courts), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1008
(1987).
84. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 13, at 21 (John W. Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992).
85. Id.
86. Id. § 203, at 362; see infra notes 87-132 and accompanying text.
87. Experts in the field of memory and perception or "eyewitness identifica-
tion" fall within this category. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 206, at 372 (John
W. Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992).
88. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
89. Id. at 1014.
90. Id. (holding that the deception test "has not yet gained such standing and
scientific recognition among physiological and psychological authorities as would
justify the courts in admitting it").
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distinct reasons for exclusion."91 This view was in line with the
belief shared by some commentators that the Frye test did not
survive the Federal Rules of Evidence. 92
The Federal Rules of Evidence, adopted in 1975, provide in
part that an expert witness's testimony should be admitted if
his or her "scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge
will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to de-
termine a fact in issue . . 93 The rule is to be read broadly
such that "the fields of knowledge which may be drawn upon
are not limited merely to the 'scientific' and 'technical' but ex-
tend to all 'specialized' knowledge."94 This language led to the
view that the Frye test had been abandoned by the Rules'
drafters.
Prior to 1993, the federal courts were divided as to the issue
of what was the appropriate standard for determining the ad-
missibility of scientific expert testimony.95 Some circuits con-
tinued to apply the Frye test.96 Others concluded that the
Federal Rules of Evidence superseded the standard set forth in
Frye, establishing a lower threshold of admissibility for expert
testimony.97
91. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 84, § 203, at 364 (reasons for exclu-
sion are limited to issues of relevance, prejudice, and expense).
92. Id. § 203, at 363-64; JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEIN-
STEIN'S EVIDENCE § 702[03], at 702-36 (1993).
93. FED. R. EVID. 702. "If scientific, technical, or specialized knowledge will
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a
witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or educa-
tion, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." Id. In May 1992,
an advisory committee proposed an amendment to Rule 702 which would require
the testimony to "substantially assist" the trier of fact. JACK B. WEINSTEIN ET AL.,
EVIDENCE, RULES, STATUTE AND CASE SUPPLEmENT 81 (1992). This proposal, which
has not been adopted, would further confuse an already murky area of law.
94. FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee's note.
95. See Mustafa v. United States, 479 U.S. 953 (1986) (White, J., dissenting
from denial of cert.).
96. See, e.g., United States v. Two Bulls, 918 F.2d 56, 60 n.7 (8th Cir. 1990);
United States v. Smith, 869 F.2d 348, 351 (7th Cir. 1989); United States v.
Shorter, 809 F.2d 54 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 817 (1987).
97. See, e.g., United States v. Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786, 794 (2d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 113 S. Ct. 104 (1992); DeLuca v. Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 911 F.2d
941, 955 (3d Cir. 1990).
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On October 13, 1992, the United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari on this very issue. 98 Less than a year later,
in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,99 the Court fi-
nally settled the split in the circuits. The Court agreed with the
lower courts and commentators who had read the Federal Rules
of Evidence as abandoning the seventy-year-old Frye test for
admissibility.100
The federal district court in Daubert had granted the de-
fendant's motion for summary judgment, finding that the ex-
pert testimony proffered by the plaintiff was inadmissible
because it was based on principles not "sufficiently established
to have general acceptance in the field to which it belongs." 10
The Ninth Circuit had affirmed, citing the Frye test.10 2 The
Supreme Court reviewed the Frye "general acceptance" test and
interpreted the language 0 3 and drafting history0 4 of the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence. 0 5 The Court concluded that the Frye
"general acceptance" test should not be applied as the exclusive
standard for the admissibility of expert testimony. 0 6 Rather,
the Court proceeded to establish a modem standard for
admissibility. 0 7
The Court held that Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence requires that any scientific expert testimony must be rel-
evant and reliable to be admissible. 0 8 Citing the rule's
"helpfulness" standard, the Court equated relevance with "a
98. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 951 F.2d 1128 (9th Cir.
1991), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 320 (1992).
99. 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
100. Id. at 2793.
101. Id. at 2792 (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 727 F.
Supp. 570, 572 (S.D. Cal. 1989) and quoting United States v. Kilgus, 571 F.2d 508,
510 (9th Cir. 1978)).
102. Id. (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 951 F.2d 1128
(1991)).
103. Id. at 2794 ("Nothing in the text of this Rule [702] establishes 'general
acceptance' as an absolute prerequisite to admissibility.").
104. Id. ("The drafting history makes no mention of Frye, and a rigid 'general
acceptance' requirement would be at odds with the 'liberal thrust' of the Federal
Rules and their 'general approach of relaxing the traditional barriers to 'opinion'
testimony.") (citations omitted).
105. Id. at 2792-94.
106. Id. at 2794.
107. Id. at 2795-99.
108. Id. at 2795.
1114 [Vol. 13:1101
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol13/iss3/7
1994] EXPERT IDENTIFICATION TESTIMONY
valid scientific connection to the pertinent inquiry" and a con-
sideration of "fit."10 9 The Court stated further that the require-
ment that an expert's testimony pertain to "scientific
knowledge" establishes a standard of evidentiary reliability
based on the concept of "good grounds."110 The testimony must
be scientifically valid and trustworthy."'
The Court suggested several questions that may be helpful
in deciding the issue of reliability." 2 They are: 1) whether the
scientific theory or technique "can be (and has been) tested"; 2)
"whether the theory or technique has been subjected to peer re-
view and publication"; 3) what is "the known or potential rate of
error" of the theory or technique; and 4) whether the theory or
technique has been "generally accepted" in the "relevant scien-
tific community." 1 3 Rejecting the defendant's concern that
abandoning the Frye test will result in "free-for-alls" which
would confound juries, the Court stated that conventional de-
vices, such as vigorous cross-examination, presentation of con-
trary evidence, careful instructions on the burden of proof, and
directed judgments, "are the appropriate safeguards where the
basis of scientific testimony meets the standards of Rule 702." 114
Thus, while the "general acceptance" test still exists as a valid
inquiry into the admissibility of an expert's testimony, it is not
a necessary precondition to admission. Furthermore, the exist-
ence of other conventional precautions should alleviate the con-
cerns associated with the testimony's admission.
b. New York Courts
Early on, the New York courts admitted expert testimony
only in cases where the facts, or the inferences to be drawn from
the facts, depended "upon professional or scientific knowledge
or skill not within the range of ordinary training or intelli-
gence."1 5 However, two New York Court of Appeals cases, De-
109. Id. at 2796 (the "fit" considers whether the facts of the case are tied to the
purpose of the proffered expert testimony).
110. Id. at 2795.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 2796-97.
113. Id. "The focus.., must be solely on principles and methodology, not on
the conclusions that they generate." Id. at 2797.
114. Id. at 2798.
115. Dougherty v. Milliken, 163 N.Y. 527, 533, 57 N.E. 757, 759 (1900).
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long v. County of Erie116 and People v. Cronin,"7 indicate that,
during the early 1980s, the standard for admissibility of expert
testimony became more lenient. 118
In Delong, one of the two issues facing the court was
whether the trial court correctly permitted an expert to testify
to the monetary value of the services of a housewife-mother not
employed outside the home. 119 The court held that the testi-
mony was properly admitted. 20 The court reasoned that "[t]he
guiding principle is that expert opinion is proper when it would
help to clarify an issue calling for professional or technical
knowledge, possessed by the expert and beyond the ken of the
typical juror."' 2 ' Because it is unlikely that jurors are knowl-
edgeable of the monetary equivalent of a housewife's services,
the expert could speak. 22
In Cronin, the same court was faced with the issue of
whether the trial court applied an incorrect standard when it
refused to permit the admission of a psychiatrist's opinion re-
garding the defendant's state of mind during the crime's com-
mission. 23 The court concluded that the psychiatrist should
have been permitted to give his opinion as to the defendant's
ability to form intent because "the facts could not be stated or
described to the jury in such a manner as to enable them to
form an accurate judgment thereon .... ",124 The court stated
that the "admissibility and bounds of expert testimony are ad-
dressed primarily to the sound discretion of the trial court
116. 60 N.Y.2d 296, 457 N.E.2d 717, 469 N.Y.S.2d 611 (1983).
117. 60 N.Y.2d 430, 458 N.E.2d 351, 470 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1983).
118. See generally JEROME PRINCE & RICHARD T. FARRELL, RICHARDSON ON Ev-
IDENCE § 367 (10th ed. Supp. 1985).
119. Delong, 60 N.Y.2d at 306, 457 N.E.2d at 722, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 617. The
plaintiffs wife had been killed by a burglar after the 911 complaint writer negli-
gently dispatched the police to the wrong home. Id. at 300-01, 457 N.E.2d at 718-
19, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 613-14.
120. Id. at 308, 457 N.E.2d at 723, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 618.
121. Id. at 307-08, 457 N.E.2d at 722-23, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 617-18 (citations
omitted) (emphasis added).
122. Id. at 307, 457 N.E.2d at 723, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 617.
123. Cronin, 60 N.Y.2d at 431-32, 458 N.E.2d at 351-52, 470 N.Y.S.2d at 110-
11. The expert psychologist was to give his opinion as to whether the defendant
could have formed the required intent for burglary and related offenses after he
drank almost a case of beer, smoked several marijuana cigarettes, and swallowed 5
to 10 valium pills. Id.
124. Id. at 433, 458 N.E.2d at 352, 470 N.Y.S.2d at 111.
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.... "125 However, the court held that the trial court failed to
exercise its proper discretion by assuming that opinions going
to the ultimate issue of the case usurp the jury's function and
are, thus, inadmissible. 126 It stated that trial courts must deter-
mine when jurors "would be benefitted by the specialized knowl-
edge of an expert witness." 27
Both Delong and Cronin presented a more liberal admissi-
bility standard tied to "helpfulness" much like the "assistance"
language in Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. How-
ever, neither case mentioned the federal Frye128 test although
the subject matter of the expert testimony in each was special-
ized or scientific in nature to some degree. Generally, though,
New York courts have utilized Frye's "general acceptance" test
when dealing with scientific expert testimony. 129 Since the re-
cent United States Supreme Court Daubert decision, 30 the New
York courts have continued to apply the Frye test while men-
tioning in the opinions that the Court rejected Frye.'3 ' These
allusions to Daubert could be indicative of changes to come in
New York law. 3 2
3. Admissibility of Expert Identification Testimony
Before the early 1980s, federal decisions involving expert
identification testimony reflected the general confusion con-
cerning the proper standard for the admissibility of scientific
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. (emphasis added).
128. See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
129. See, e.g., People v. Hughes, 59 N.Y.2d 523, 453 N.E.2d 484, 466 N.Y.S.2d
255 (1983) (evidence of hypnotically induced statements inadmissible); People v.
Middleton, 54 N.Y.2d 42,429 N.E.2d 100, 444 N.Y.S.2d 581 (1981) (evidence of bite
mark tests admissible); People v. Allweiss, 48 N.Y.2d 40, 396 N.E.2d 735, 421
N.Y.S.2d 341 (1979); People v. Leone, 25 N.Y.2d 511, 255 N.E.2d 696, 307 N.Y.S.2d
430 (1969) (lie detector evidence inadmissible); Beuschel v. Manowitz, 271 N.Y.S.
277 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1934) (first New York case to cite Frye permitting use
of blood test for paternity proof).
130. See supra notes 98-114 and accompanying text.
131. See People v. Moore, No. 65971, 1993 WL 511845, at *1 (N.Y. App. Div.
3d Dep't Dec. 9, 1993); People v. Swamp, No. 68447, 1993 WL 495517, at *2 n.1
(N.Y. App. Div. 3d Dep't Dec. 2, 1993); People v. Kral, No. 63718, 1993 VL 477097,
at *1-2 n.1 (N.Y. App. Div. 3d Dep't Nov. 18, 1993).
132. The potential impact of Daubert is vast, and courts will have to recon-
sider the admissibility of many types of scientific evidence." David 0. Stewart, A
New Test, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1993, at 48, 51.
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expert testimony and indicated a hesitancy to admit expert tes-
timony due to a lack of understanding of the field. 133 As the
science of memory and perception matured and the research ex-
panded, the weight of modern authority in federal as well as
state courts began to lean toward admission of this evidence.13 4
During the 1980s, some federal and state courts clearly estab-
lished persuasive reasoning for the admission of expert testi-
mony regarding eyewitness identification. 135
a. Federal Courts
Although the United States Supreme Court has never dealt
directly with an admissibility question regarding expert identi-
fication testimony, some of its decisions have provided indica-
tions of a possible future disposition on that issue. In Neil v.
Biggers,136 the Court endorsed the idea of using eyewitness con-
fidence as a useful factor in judging eyewitness accuracy. 137 In
Biggers, the Court held that evidence of the victim's identifica-
tion of the defendant at a show-up seven months after her rape
was properly admitted due to, among other factors, the fact that
"Is]he had 'no doubt' that [the defendant] was the person who
raped her."138
Almost a decade later in Watkins v. Sowders,13 9 the Court
found that eyewitness reliability can be assessed adequately
133. See United States v. Fosher, 590 F.2d 381 (1st Cir. 1979); Dyas v. United
States, 376 A.2d 827 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 973 (1977); United States v.
Brown, 501 F.2d 146 (9th Cir. 1974), rev'd sub nom. United States v. Nobles, 422
U.S. 225 (1975).
134. See United States v. Moore, 786 F.2d 1308 (5th Cir. 1986); United States
v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1985); United States v. Smith, 736 F.2d 1103
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 868 (1984); State v. Chapple, 660 P.2d 1208 (Ariz.
1983); People v. McDonald, 690 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1984); State v. Moon, 726 P.2d 1263
(Wash. Ct. App. 1986).
135. See infra notes 147-85 and accompanying text.
136. 409 U.S. 188 (1972).
137. Id. at 199-200 ("[Tlhe factors to be considered in evaluating the likeli-
hood of misidentification include the opportunity of the witness to view the crimi-
nal at the time of the crime, the witness'[s] degree of attention, the accuracy of the
witness'[s] prior description of the criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated by
the witness at the confrontation, and the length of time between the crime and the
confrontation.") (emphasis added).
138. Id. at 200-01.
139. 449 U.S. 341 (1981).
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from competent cross-examination. 140 Thus, the Court held
that a pretrial judicial determination of the admissibility of
identification evidence is not per se constitutionally required.14'
However, a strong dissenting opinion by Justice Brennan coun-
tered that cross-examination is inadequate to test the reliability
of eyewitness testimony.142 He urged that "the jury is likely to
give the erroneously admitted evidence substantial weight,
however skillful the cross-examination." 43
Because the major premise underlying arguments for the
admission of expert identification testimony is that, according
to studies, there is often no correlation between eyewitness con-
fidence and eyewitness accuracy, these Supreme Court deci-
sions indicate a possible suspicion of the research results. 144
However, these positions by the Court can now be more firmly
challenged by the large body of research that has continued to
develop in the field since the time those cases were decided. 45
Furthermore, the Court's Daubert decision may be read to im-
plicitly accept studies from the field of memory and perception
as valid expert subject matter. 46 In any case, the Supreme
Court's view on the matter is unclear.
The law in this area has more specifically developed in the
circuit courts. The case that may have opened the door to sub-
140. Id. at 348-49. "iU]nder our adversary system of justice, cross-examina-
tion has always been considered a most effective way to ascertain truth." Id. at
349.
141. Id. at 349. One of the store employees identified Watkins in a line-up as
the gunman who attempted to rob the store after which the other injured store
employee also identified him in a hospital room show-up. Id. at 342-43. Both
were extensively cross-examined as were the police officers who arranged the iden-
tifications. Id.
142. Id. at 356-57 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[Ciross-examination is both an
ineffective and a wrong tool for purging inadmissible identification evidence from
the jurors' minds . . . because all of the scientific evidence suggests that much
eyewitness identification testimony has an unduly powerful effect on jurors.").
143. Id. at 347.
144. The suspicion of this underlying premise is evident by the Court's seem-
ing reliance on the common misconception that a confident witness is an accurate
one. See supra notes 73-78 and accompanying text.
145. See discussion supra part II.A.
146. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2797
(1993) (citing United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1985)). In Daubert,
the Court cited with approval the Third Circuit's reasoning in Downing. Id. The
Downing case specifically dealt with the admissibility of expert testimony regard-
ing eyewitness identification. See infra notes 154-64 and accompanying text.
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sequent rulings on discretionary decisions regarding admissibil-
ity is United States v. Smith.147 While the Sixth Circuit, in
Smith, did not reverse the trial court conviction because of the
harmless error doctrine, it found that psychological expert testi-
mony in the area of eyewitness identification had become ac-
knowledged as a reliable science. 148 The court reasoned that not
only does the field of eyewitness identification surpass common
knowledge, but also that it questions the common-sense evalua-
tion ofjurors.149 By citing an earlier court of appeals case, 50 the
court reaffirmed that it would "'not hesitate to step in' where it
can be shown that the trial court erred in excluding expert testi-
mony."' 51 Furthermore, the court warned that the language of
Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence indicates that the
term "expert" should be construed broadly. 52 As long as the ex-
pert's offer of proof is related to the facts of the case, the court
held that the testimony should be admitted. 53
While Smith did not directly address the applicability of
the Frye test, the Third Circuit clearly rejected the Frye stan-
dard in United States v. Downing.l 4 The trial court had re-
jected the defendant's request to offer the testimony of a
psychologist who would address the problems associated with
identifications. 55 The court held that Rule 702 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence permits a defendant to call an expert in the
field of memory and perception to testify to the reliability of eye-
witness identifications. 156 Further, it held that the trial court's
147. 736 F.2d 1103 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 868 (1984).
148. Id. at 1106-07; see also United States v. Moore, 786 F.2d 1308, 1312 (5th
Cir. 1986) ("The scientific validity of the studies confirming the many weaknesses
of eyewitness identification cannot be seriously questioned at this point.") (citation
omitted).
149. Id.
150. Mannino v. International Mfg. Co., 650 F.2d 846 (6th Cir. 1981).
151. Smith, 736 F.2d at 1107.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 1106. Since the bank employees who witnessed the robbery were
Caucasian while the defendant was black, it was a case of cross-racial identifica-
tion. Id. Since the witnesses were shown a photographic array three weeks after
the robbery in which the defendant's picture was included, and then four months
later, they were asked to identify the perpetrator in a line-up that included the
defendant, it was a matter of unconscious transference. Id.
154. 753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1985).
155. Id. at 1228.
156. Id. at 1226.
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error in excluding this evidence could not be harmless because
of the prosecutor's apparent reliance on the eyewitness testi-
mony for the case-in-chief.157
The Downing court fashioned an analytical framework for
testing admissibility. 5 8 The threshold inquiry is whether the
reliability of the scientific principles and potential to aid the
jury outweigh the likelihood that the testimony will overwhelm
or mislead the jury.59 If so, the second question is whether a
"fit" exists between the proffered testimony and the facts of eye-
witness identification in the particular case. 60 The court rea-
soned that the "general acceptance standard" of the Frye test
should be abandoned as an independent test for admissibility of
scientific expert testimony.' 6 ' It explained that the Frye test
"proved to be too malleable to provide the method for orderly
and uniform decision-making . .. "162 The analytical frame-
work set forth in its opinion, the court noted, was more in line
with the language and spirit of Rule 702 than the conservative
approach of Frye.6 3 Further, the court rejected the argument
that cross-examination of the expert would be adequate to allow
the jury to properly weigh the eyewitness's testimony.' 64
While there have been some differences of opinion among
the circuits concerning the general admissibility of "novel" ex-
pert testimony, 65 generally the federal courts have continued to
apply the Downing standard to cases involving expert identifi-
cation testimony. 6 6 Reflecting the emerging trend toward ad-
157. Id.
158. Id. at 1237-42.
159. Id. at 1237-41.
160. Id. at 1242; see supra note 109 and accompanying text.
161. Id. at 1237.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 1230 n.6.
165. The United States Supreme Court's Daubert decision seems to have set-
tled the law in this area for federal courts. See Frymire-Brinati v. KPMG Peat
Marwick, 2 F.3d 183, 186-87 (7th Cir. 1993); Cantrell v. GAF Corp., 999 F.2d 1007,
1013-14 (6th Cir. 1993); Datskow v. Teledyne Continental Motors Aircraft Prods.,
826 F. Supp. 677, 682 n.1 (W.D.N.Y. 1993).
166. United States v. Curry, 977 F.2d 1042, 1051 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied
sub nom. Holland v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 1357 (1993); United States v. Ste-
vens, 935 F.2d 1380, 1383 (3d Cir. 1991); United States v. Dowling, 855 F.2d 114,
118 (3d Cir. 1988); United States v. Blade, 811 F.2d 461, 465 (8th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 484 U.S. 839 (1987); United States v. Moore, 786 F.2d 1308, 1312 (5th Cir.
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missibility, these courts have found that the field of memory
and perception, as it relates to the eyewitness identification
process, is a reliable and useful subject matter for expert assist-
ance in the courtroom. 167
b. State Courts
Similarly, certain state courts embraced the science of ex-
pert identification testimony by providing clear guidelines to its
admission. In State v. Chapple,168 the Arizona Supreme Court
reversed a lower court decision to exclude expert testimony re-
lating to eyewitness reliability. Applying a fairly strict admissi-
bility test from United States v. Amaral,16 9 the court found that
the expert was qualified, the subject was proper, the testimony
conformed to a generally accepted theory, and the probative
value outweighed the prejudicial effect.170 Like the Federal
Rules, the Arizona Rules of Evidence require that the expert's
"specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand
the evidence .. ".. ,171 The court reasoned that the probative
value of the expert's testimony would outweigh any prejudice
because of the "generality" of the testimony. 172 It also noted
that the expert would not draw a conclusion or present an opin-
ion. 173 The average juror, the court held, would not be aware of
the variables concerning identification and memory about
which the expert was qualified to testify. 174 Finding that one of
1986); United States v. Ferri, 778 F.2d 985, 988-90 (3d Cir. 1985). But see United
States v. Langford, 802 F.2d 1176, 1181-84 (9th Cir. 1986) (Ferguson, J., dissent-
ing), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1008 (1987). Since the United States Supreme Court
incorporated much of the Downing reasoning into its Daubert decision, it can be
assumed that federal courts will continue to admit expert identification evidence
where appropriate. See supra notes 98-114 and accompanying text.
167. "[M]ost persons do not understand the intricacies of perception, reten-
tion, and recall." Curry, 977 F.2d at 1051.
168. 660 P.2d 1208 (Ariz. 1983).
169. 488 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1973) (holding that the exclusion of expert identi-
fication testimony was within the trial court's discretion). The Amaral court set
forth four criteria for determining the admissibility of such expert testimony. Id.
at 1153. This testimony is admissible if: 1) the expert is qualified; 2) the subject is
a proper one; 3) the testimony conforms to a generally accepted explanatory the-
ory; and 4) the probative value outweighs the prejudicial effect. Id.
170. 660 P.2d at 1218.
171. Id. (citing Axiz. R. EVID. 702).
172. Id. at 1219.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 1221.
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the case's major issues was the accuracy of the eyewitness iden-
tification, 175 the court concluded that the study of memory and
identification was a proper subject for expert testimony and
should have been admitted.176
In People v. McDonald,177 the California Supreme Court
held that the trial court prejudicially abused its discretion in
excluding expert testimony on the psychological factors affect-
ing the accuracy of eyewitness testimony. 78 The court noted
that the trial court's discretion to admit or exclude expert testi-
mony is not absolute. 79 It reasoned that the Frye standard does
not apply to expert testimony which lacks the "aura of infallibil-
ity" that surrounds novel scientific devices or processes. 80 In-
stead, the court stated that expert identification testimony
should be admitted when the facts of the case indicate a depen-
dence by the prosecution on the identification as a key element
and when no substantially corroborating evidence exists.' 8 '
In State v. Moon, 8 2 the Washington Court of Appeals held
that the trial court's exclusion of expert identification testimony
constituted reversible error. 83 The court reasoned that the tes-
timony would not invade the province of the jury because the
trial court has broad discretion in limiting the expert's testi-
mony (such as by excluding an opinion) and "that an expert can-
not usurp the jury's duty of deciding facts because the jury may
always accept or reject the expert's evidence or opinion ....,"184
Thus, the court stated that if the expert testimony will be help-
ful to the jury, the court should admit it.185
C. New York Courts and Expert Identification Testimony
Prior to People v. Mooney,186 the only New York Court of
Appeals case to deal with the admissibility of expert identifica-
175. Id. at 1222.
176. Id. at 1221.
177. 690 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1984).
178. Id. at 726.
179. Id. at 724.
180. Id. at 723-24.
181. Id. at 727.
182. 726 P.2d 1263 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986).
183. Id. at 1268.
184. Id. at 1267.
185. Id. at 1268.
186. 76 N.Y.2d 827, 559 N.E.2d 1274, 560 N.Y.S.2d 115 (1990).
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tion testimony, lower courts in New York shared the same con-
fusion as other jurisdictions regarding the standard of
admissibility to apply to this evidence. While some courts ad-
mitted the expert testimony, 187 others rejected it outright. 88
Even when courts were in agreement regarding the question of
admissibility, rarely did they agree as to the rationale for ad-
mission or exclusion. 8 9 However, unlike federal and other state
courts, New York courts have not begun to open their doors to
these experts.190
1. Pre-Mooney Decisions
In People v. Brown,191 the Westchester County Court held
that expert testimony in the field of memory, perception and
identification testimony was inadmissible. 192 The case involved
a robbery and the use of a firearm. 193 Among other factors af-
fecting identifications, the expert was to testify to the phenom-
ena of "weapon focus" and loss of memory. 194 Revealing the
early skepticism of the field, the court reasoned that the ex-
pert's research had not reached the level of general acceptance
required under the Frye v. United States 95 standard. 196 In any
event, the court added, "the ultimate determination of the credi-
bility of an identification witness['s] testimony is, quite properly
the sole province of the jury ....- 197
187. People v. Beckford, 141 Misc. 2d 71, 532 N.Y.S.2d 462 (Sup. Ct. Kings
County 1988); People v. Lewis, 137 Misc. 2d 84, 520 N.Y.S.2d 125 (Monroe County
Ct. 1987); People v. Brooks, 128 Misc. 2d 608, 490 N.Y.S.2d 692 (Westchester
County Ct. 1985).
188. People v. Schor, 135 Misc. 2d 636, 516 N.Y.S.2d 436 (Dist. Ct. Nassau
County 1987); People v. Brown, 117 Misc. 2d 587, 459 N.Y.S.2d 227 (Westchester
County Ct. 1983).
189. See infra notes 191-263 and accompanying text.
190. Brosnahan & Loewenson, Jr., supra note 9, at 1 ("While some courts
have shown an increasing tolerance for expert testimony on this subject, New York
State ... [has] remained hesitant to take this step.").
191. 117 Misc. 2d 587, 459 N.Y.S.2d 227 (Westchester County Ct. 1983).
192. Id. at 593-94, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 232.
193. Id. at 587, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 228.
194. Id. at 593, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 232; see supra notes 41-45, 52-59 and accom-
panying text.
195. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923); see supra notes 88-90 and accompanying
text.
196. Brown, 117 Misc. 2d at 593, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 232.
197. Id. at 594, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 232.
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Two years later in People v. Brooks,198 the same court held
that expert identification testimony was admissible when it was
limited to an explanation of the studies relevant to the facts of
the case such that no opinions were to be given.199 The court
reasoned that the testimony will present a system of analysis
that is likely to add to the jury's common understanding of the
identification issue.200 The court addressed both concerns
raised by the court in the Brown decision, where such testimony
was excluded. 20'
Citing the national trend to include such evidence, the
court found that the Frye test was now satisfied if it was still,
indeed, the law.20 2 The court stated that "a proper analysis of
the propriety of expert testimony ... involves inquiry into the
relationship among: (a) the subject of the expert's testimony; (b)
the issue presented to the jury; and (c) the information pos-
sessed by the average juror."20 3 Because the body of informa-
tion now available is sufficiently beyond common experience,
the court held that the expert testimony does not usurp the
function of the jury.204 Instead, the court determined that the
evidence assists the jury in making a more informed decision. 20 5
Two years after Brooks, however, the Nassau County Dis-
trict Court in People v. Schor,20 6 held that the testimony by a
psychologist regarding the reliability of eyewitness identifica-
tion of defendants was not admissible. 20 7 In Schor, two victims
were assaulted by ten unknown assailants. 208 Because they be-
lieved the perpetrators to be college students, the victims were
permitted to view student photographs and football pictures. 20 9
198. 128 Misc. 2d 608, 490 N.Y.S.2d 692 (Westchester County Ct. 1985).
199. Id. at 621, 490 N.Y.S.2d at 702.
200. Id. at 618-19, 490 N.Y.S.2d at 700-01.
201. See infra notes 202-05 and accompanying text.
202. Id. at 612, 490 N.Y.S.2d at 696.
203. Id. at 614, 490 N.Y.S.2d at 697-98.
204. Id. at 618, 490 N.Y.S.2d at 700.
205. Id. at 618-19, 490 N.Y.S.2d at 700-01; see supra notes 115-32 and accom-
panying text.
206. 135 Misc. 2d 636, 516 N.Y.S.2d 436 (Dist. Ct. Nassau County 1987).
207. Id. at 642, 516 N.Y.S.2d at 440.
208. Id. at 637, 516 N.Y.S.2d at 437.
209. Id.
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The victims independently identified the defendants as the
attackers. 210
Because there was no evidence indicating that the eyewit-
nesses had been emotionally or psychologically scarred as a re-
sult of the crime, the court reasoned that the expert testimony
would not assist the jurors.211 The court distinguished Brooks
because that case involved the crime of rape and sexual as-
sault.212 This type of expert testimony might be admissible, the
court noted, in a rape or sexual assault case because they "are
both heinous crimes which would give rise to perhaps an emo-
tional and psychologically impaired victim." 213 In the case of a
simple assault, the court concluded that an identification is not
so suspect as to require expert testimony.214
Later that year, in People v. Lewis,21 5 the Monroe County
Court held that expert testimony was admissible in a case that
hinged on identification testimony of a witness who viewed the
suspect for a matter of a minute or less. 21 6 The case involved a
robbery at knifepoint, and the eyewitness identification was the
only evidence tying the defendant to the crime.217 The expert
was to testify to such factors as stress of the victim, violence of
the event, and cross-racial identification.218 In an apparent en-
dorsement of the field, the court implicitly rejected the Brown
and Schor reasoning by citing People v. McDonald21 9 and State
v. Chapple220 finding that "there now appears to be an extensive
body of scientific studies that details the processing of informa-
tion, perception, memory and recall." 221 Citing People v.
Cronin222 and Delong v. County of Erie,223 the court reasoned
210. Id.
211. Id. at 641, 516 N.Y.S.2d at 440.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. 137 Misc. 2d 84, 520 N.Y.S.2d 125 (Monroe County Ct. 1987).
216. Id. at 86, 520 N.Y.S.2d at 127.
217. Id. at 85-86, 520 N.Y.S.2d at 126.
218. Id. at 85, 520 N.Y.S.2d at 126.
219. 690 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1984); see supra notes 177-81 and accompanying text.
220. 660 P.2d 1208 (Ariz. 1983); see supra notes 168-76 and accompanying
text.
221. Lewis, 137 Misc. 2d. at 86, 520 N.Y.S.2d at 127.
222. 60 N.Y.2d 430, 458 N.E.2d 351, 470 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1983); see supra notes
123-27 and accompanying text.
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that the expert testimony, with proper limitations, 224 would be
"helpful" in clarifying the issue of identification reliability,
which calls for professional knowledge.
225
Similarly, in People v. Beckford,226 the New York Supreme
Court held that expert identification testimony is admissible in
a robbery case if there is a limit to the testimony and a limiting
charge to the jury.2 2 7 The expert testimony was to explain the
concepts of unconscious transference and cross-racial identifica-
tions, to discuss the effects of stress and delay on the identifica-
tion process and to explain the lack of correlation between the
confidence and accuracy of the eyewitness's memory. 228 The
court reasoned that the testimony will clarify and assist jurors
in areas that are not within their typical understanding without
invading their fact-finding province. 229 In an even stronger en-
dorsement of the field, the court stated that the processes and
factors that the expert will testify to are "essential" and "not in
accord with common perceptions. . . ."230 The court specifically
noted that the testimony regarding cross-racial identifications
would provide a basis for the jurors to comfortably speak of the
subject in deliberations. 231
Finally, after Beckford, the Second Department decided
three cases concerning expert identification testimony before
the Court of Appeals addressed this issue.232 In each case, the
223. 60 N.Y.2d 296, 459 N.E.2d 717, 469 N.Y.S.2d 611 (1983); see supra notes
119-22 and accompanying text.
224. The court required that: 1) the expert's qualifications be established
outside the jury's presence; 2) the expert discuss the factors generally; 3) the ex-
pert give no opinion; 4) the expert not testify that undue emphasis is placed on
laymen identification; 5) the expert be prohibited from testifying that cross-exami-
nation is ineffective in discerning the reliability of eyewitness testimony; and 6)
the expert not speak of studies familiar to jurors. Lewis, 137 Misc. 2d at 86-87, 520
N.Y.S.2d at 127.
225. Lewis, 137 Misc. 2d at 86, 520 N.Y.S.2d at 127.
226. 141 Misc. 2d 71, 532 N.Y.S.2d 462 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1988).
227. Id. at 73-74, 532 N.Y.S.2d at 463.
228. Id. at 74, 76-77, 532 N.Y.S.2d at 464-65; see supra notes 35-40, 52-59, 64-
78 and accompanying text.
229. Id. at 75-76, 532 N.Y.S.2d at 464.
230. Id. at 75, 532 N.Y.S.2d at 464.
231. Id. at 76-77, 532 N.Y.S.2d at 465; see supra note 69 and accompanying
text.
232. See People v. Wright, 161 A.D.2d 743, 558 N.Y.S.2d 842 (2d Dep't 1990);
People v. Gibbs, 157 A.D.2d 799, 550 N.Y.S.2d 400 (2d Dep't 1990); People v.
Foulks, 143 A.D.2d 1038, 533 N.Y.S.2d 619 (2d Dep't 1988).
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court upheld the trial court's exclusion of the testimony, stating
that it was not a proper expert subject because "it pertains to
matters of common knowledge . .. not beyond the ken of lay
jurors."233 The Second Department had apparently ignored or
chosen to disagree with the large body of research on the subject
of eyewitness identification that had developed up to that point
in time. 234
2. The Mooney Decision
The New York Court of Appeals' first and only review of a
decision concerning expert identification testimony was in Peo-
ple v. Mooney. 235 The case involved four robberies of taxi cab
drivers. 236 In each robbery, the assailant requested a destina-
tion, then grabbed the driver from behind, putting a knife to his
neck. 237 Next, the assailant took the driver's money, hopped
into the front seat, pushed the driver out of the cab and drove
off.238 Each of the drivers identified the defendant, sometime
after the robberies, as the assailant and each one claimed that
they were "positive" or "sure" of the identifications. 239
The supreme court, without granting a hearing, held that
expert identification testimony was inadmissible as a matter of
law.240 The defendant was later convicted on the four robbery
counts and sentenced to five to eighteen years in prison.241 Af-
ter the First Department affirmed, the defendant appealed to
the Court of Appeals.
In three sentences, the Court of Appeals held that the trial
court acted within its sound discretion in excluding the expert
identification testimony and that the court need not decide
whether the expert testimony sought to be presented was of the
233. Wright, 161 A.D.2d at 743, 558 N.Y.S.2d at 842; Gibbs, 157 A.D.2d at
799, 550 N.Y.S.2d at 400; Foulks, 143 A.D.2d at 1039, 533 N.Y.S.2d at 620.
234. See supra notes 14-78 and accompanying text.
235. 76 N.Y.2d 827, 559 N.E.2d 1274, 560 N.Y.S.2d 115 (1990).
236. Appellant's Brief at 11-16, People v. Mooney, 76 N.Y.2d 827, 559 N.E.2d
1274, 560 N.Y.S.2d 115 (1990) (Nos. 2504-85 & 1726-85).
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 10; People v. Mooney, Nos. 2504-85 & 1726-85, slip op. at 4 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. Bronx County Jan. 14, 1987).
241. Appellant's Brief at 25, Mooney, (Nos. 2504-85 & 1726-85).
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type that could be presented.242 Refusing to decide whether ex-
pert identification testimony may, generally, be admitted, the
court reasoned that no question of law existed because the trial
court based its decision upon the exercise of its discretion. 243
A lengthy dissent written by then-Judge Judith S. Kaye ar-
gued that the trial court's conviction should have been re-
versed.244 She reasoned that the trial court failed to exercise its
proper discretion.245 The trial court had given three reasons for
disallowing the expert testimony and the dissent criticized each
as not including an assessment of the facts of the case.246 The
dissent stressed that the trial court decision "was not the result
of... a discretionary assessment of the probative value of the
testimony in relation to the facts of th[e] case."247 Instead,
Judge Kaye provided, the decision was based upon generality
and mistaken legal analysis.248
242. Mooney, 76 N.Y.2d at 828, 559 N.E.2d at 1274, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 115.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 833, 559 N.E.2d at 1277, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 118 (Kaye, J., dissenting).
245. Id. at 828-29, 559 N.E.2d at 1275, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 116. Judge Kaye,
citing Cronin, stated that the New York Court of Appeals has "power to review
even a trial court's discretionary decision where the legal claim is made that,
through application of an incorrect standard, the court failed to exercise its discre-
tion or that the decision was so unreasonable as to constitute clear abuse." Id.
(citing People v. Cronin, 60 N.Y.2d 430, 433, 458 N.E.2d 351, 352, 470 N.Y.S.2d
110, 111 (1983)).
246. The three reasons stated by the trial court were: 1) "The accuracy and
reliability of psychological tests regarding perceptual factors in identification have
not been accept[ed] by the scientific community" (Judge Kaye countered that even
if the Frye test is still the law, it is satisfied here.), id. at 829-30, 559 N.E.2d at
1275-76, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 116-17 (brackets in original) (quoting People v. Mooney,
Nos. 2504-85 & 1726-85, slip op. at 2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Bronx County Jan. 14, 1987);
2) "[Sluch testimony .. . would be cumulative" (Judge Kaye countered that the
cross-examination and jury charge will not adequately describe phenomena that
the expert would testify to.), id. at 830-32, 559 N.E.2d at 1276-77, 560 N.Y.S.2d at
117-18 (brackets in original) (quoting Mooney, slip op. at 3); and 3) "Expert testi-
mony must by the very nature, be beyond the ken ofjurors whose basic intelligence
should not be underestimated." (Judge Kaye countered that research has demon-
strated that the subject matter is often beyond the common understanding of
laypersons often resulting in misconception.), id. at 832-33, 559 N.E.2d at 1277,
560 N.Y.S.2d at 118 (quoting Mooney, slip op. at 3).
247. Mooney, 76 N.Y.2d at 833, 559 N.E.2d at 1278, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 119.
248. Id.
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3. Post-Mooney Decisions
Following the Mooney decision, the New York decisions re-
vealed a continued, possibly more divergent, pattern of reason-
ing regarding the expert admissibility question. In People v.
Knighton,249 the Third Department held that there was no
abuse of discretion in the trial court's refusing to admit the ex-
pert identification testimony.250 The case involved a supermar-
ket robbery. 251  Three market employees identified the
defendant from a photographic array.252 The court reasoned
that the trial court was within its discretion in finding that the
expert testimony would not be helpful because the subject mat-
ter of the testimony was within the common understanding of
laypersons. 253 Because traditional direct and cross-examination
techniques and a charge that urged the jury to carefully scruti-
nize eyewitness identifications would suffice in bringing out fac-
tors bearing on the reliability of identifications, the court stated
that, generally, this type of expert would only invade the prov-
ince of the jury if permitted to testify.254
Later in People v. Wong,255 the supreme court held that the
expert identification testimony was inadmissible and that no
sufficient basis for presenting the reliability expert was
made.256 While the court reached the same decision as the
Knighton court regarding admissibility, the rationale was con-
siderably different. The prosecutor's murder case in Wong
rested upon a single eyewitness who allegedly observed the de-
fendant for about twenty seconds. 257 In substantially relying on
the Mooney dissent, the court found that:
(1) The testimony of an expert witness in the field of memory and
perception is a matter of discretion which should be determined
by the facts of each individual case[;] (2) This discretion is ...
clearly not applicable to the average case since the issue of identi-
fication is within the scope and understanding of the normal ju-
249. 165 A.D.2d 904, 560 N.Y.S.2d 514 (3d Dep't 1990).
250. Id. at 906, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 516.
251. Id. at 904, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 515.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 906, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 516.
254. Id.
255. 150 Misc. 2d 554, 568 N.Y.S.2d 1020 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1991).
256. Id. at 559, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 1024.
257. Id. at 555, 559, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 1021, 1024.
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ror[; and] (3) Such a witness may be utilized only after a
discretionary assessment of the probative value of such testimony
is made in relation to the facts of the specific case.258
The court reasoned that, in the Wong case, there was no show-
ing of a need for expert testimony based on the facts of the
case.259 The court concluded that the jury could assess the iden-
tification on its own since it is within their common
knowledge. 260
Finally, in People v. McCray,261 the First Department was
faced with a case involving the admissibility of expert identifi-
cation testimony, but failed to follow the Wong court's rationale.
The court held that no error was committed by the trial court in
not permitting the defendant charged with rape, sodomy and
sexual abuse to call an expert witness in the field of memory
and perception.262 Rather than give any reasoning indicating a
close review of the trial court's discretionary decision, the court
simply referenced the Mooney decision as authority.263 Thus,
the New York courts' most recent decisions regarding the ad-
missibility of expert identification testimony provide no clear di-
rection as to where the law is headed.
III. Analysis
The New York Court of Appeals' majority opinion in People
v. Mooney264 fails to comport with the state's fair system of jus-
tice and its corresponding search for the truth. There are two
reasons for this conclusion. First, the Court of Appeals refused
258. Id. at 558, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 1023.
259. Id. at 559, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 1024 (witness's viewing was not "'quick', in-
distinct, or made on city streets at night" and the victim and defendant were of the
same race). But see People v. Mateo Lawson, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 26, 1993, at 26 (Sup.
Ct. New York County) (holding that, where defendant was Hispanic and witness
was Japanese, expert testimony regarding cross-racial misidentification phenom-
ena was admissible); People v. Green, 151 Misc. 2d 194, 198, 573 N.Y.S.2d 113, 115
(1991) (admitting expert testimony on confidence/accuracy relationship and the
impact of stress on identifications where victim was violently accosted in building
hallway).
260. Id. at 556, 559, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 1022, 1024.
261. 184 A.D.2d 250, 585 N.Y.S.2d 192 (1st Dep't), appeal denied, 80 N.Y.2d
906, 602 N.E.2d 240, 588 N.Y.S.2d 832 (1992).
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. 76 N.Y.2d 827, 559 N.E.2d 1274, 560 N.Y.S.2d 115 (1990).
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to take the opportunity to pronounce a common standard for the
admissibility of expert identification testimony where one was
needed. 265 Prior to the Mooney decision, the New York trial
courts were sometimes reluctant to admit defendants' identifi-
cation experts due to confusion regarding the applicable stan-
dard for admissibility.26 6 While federal courts and other state
courts were following a trend toward admissibility,267 the New
York trial courts admitted and excluded the testimony with no
apparent uniformity of reasoning. 268 Furthermore, the Appel-
late Division showed no interest in questioning trial court deci-
sions excluding such testimony.26 9 As a result of the Mooney
decision's silence on the matter, the lower courts continue to use
ad hoc types of reasoning in their decisions regarding the ad-
missibility of expert identification testimony.270 Therefore, the
Court of Appeals could have used the Mooney case to settle the
law in this area, but chose not to do so.
Second and more disconcerting, the lower courts may have
interpreted the Mooney decision as discrediting the admissibil-
ity of expert testimony offered by the defense for the purpose of
securing a fair trial.271 For a state court system that prides it-
self on the added protections provided to its citizens over and
above those provided by the federal system and other state
court systems,272 the Mooney decision is an aberration. 273 The
New York court decisions following Mooney indicate that a pos-
sibly unintended message was delivered by the decision. The
Court of Appeals' failure to settle the law in this area, in light of
the confused discretionary decisions leading up to the case, im-
plicates what could be an inherent social bias against defend-
ants existing even in this most progressive of jurisdictions.
265. See infra notes 274-322 and accompanying text.
266. See supra notes 191-234 and accompanying text.
267. See supra notes 133-85 and accompanying text.
268. See supra notes 191-234 and accompanying text.
269. See supra notes 232-34 and accompanying text.
270. See supra notes 249-63 and accompanying text.
271. See infra notes 323-42 and accompanying text.
272. See, e.g., People v. Scott, 79 N.Y.2d 474, 488, 593 N.E.2d 1328, 1337, 583
N.Y.S.2d 920, 929 (1992) (rejecting United States Supreme Court "open fields" doc-
trine by interpreting greater privacy rights in state constitutional provision than
in Fourth Amendment, and citing "New York's tradition of tolerance of the
unconventional").
273. See infra notes 323-42 and accompanying text.
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A. Lack of Direction
Each of the major premises invoked by the proponents of
excluding expert identification testimony has been refuted by
years of experience and well-thought-out judicial reasoning. In
United States v. Downing274 and State v. Chapple,275 both the
federal and state courts responded to the emerging field of
memory and perception relating to eyewitness testimony.276
Those courts also responded to the evolving rules of evidence
that began to reflect a more liberal policy of admissibility of ex-
pert testimony in general.277
Two arguments have been primarily employed in support of
excluding expert identification testimony. The first argument
is that the science of memory and perception relating to eyewit-
ness identification is not generally accepted within the scientific
community.278 This argument is countered by the large body of
experimental psychology research that has developed over the
last decade and a half.27 9 While some psychologists debate the
conclusions and applications, the basic methodology of the sci-
ence and the resulting data are accepted as reliable sources of
information.280 Any concern that experts will ultimately "bat-
tle" in the courtroom disregards the fact that expert "battles"
occur in any complex trial including nearly every medical mal-
practice trial.28' Certainly medicine is a generally accepted sci-
ence regardless of the disagreements among experts.
Therefore, the "general acceptance" standard from United
274. 753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1985); see supra notes 154-64 and accompanying
text.
275. 660 P.2d 1208 (Ariz. 1983); see supra notes 168-76 and accompanying
text.
276. See supra notes 14-78 and accompanying text.
277. See supra notes 84-114 and accompanying text. That more liberal policy
was seemingly embraced by the United States Supreme Court in Daubert. See
supra notes 98-114 and accompanying text.
278. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
279. See discussion supra part II.A.
280. LoFrus & DOYLE, supra note 15, at 295.
281. See, e.g., Kramer Serv., Inc. v. Wilkins, 186 So. 625 (Miss. 1939) (early
case featuring one such "battle" between one medical expert who testified that the
plaintiffs trauma could not cause cancer and the other who testified that the possi-
bility of causation did exist).
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States v. Frye,282 if it is still acceptable law in New York, 283 is
satisfied by the field of memory and perception.
The second objection to admissibility is that, because the
testimony relates to the credibility of the eyewitness, it neces-
sarily "invades the province of the jury."284 This argument actu-
ally has two parts. One part of the argument is that the
testimony is not probative 28 5 and the other part is that the testi-
mony is unfairly prejudicial to the jury.286
All expert testimony invades the province of the jury to
some extent.28 7 However, as long as courts leave ultimate deci-
sions to the jury, including whether to accept or reject the ex-
pert testimony itself, the role of the jury is not disturbed.
Expert testimony in the field of memory and perception is pro-
bative in most cases involving eyewitness identifications be-
cause it refutes certain commonly held misconceptions. 288 The
testimony refutes the videotape metaphor by describing the
complex process of identification and undermines the juror's ab-
solute confidence in the eyewitness's accuracy. 28 9 Other meth-
ods such as cross-examination and jury instructions are not
sufficient to reveal such information as the relationship be-
tween stress and the overestimation or underestimation of an
282. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923); see supra notes 88-90 and accompanying
text.
283. Because the United States Supreme Court, in Daubert v. Merrill Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993), abandoned the Frye test of admissi-
bility, the likelihood of a state's maintaining the ancient rule is minimal consider-
ing the standard was first espoused by a federal court. See supra notes 98-114 and
accompanying text. For state decisions that have acknowledged Daubert, see Peo-
ple v. Leahy, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 322, 324-25 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (stating that the
state's Frye rule "might be ripe for reexamination"); Public Serv. Co. v. Willows
Water Dist., 856 P.2d 829, 831 n.1 (Colo. 1993) (citing Daubert's rejection of Frye
test); Nelson v. State, 628 A.2d 69, 74 (Del. 1993) (stating that Delaware law not
governed by Frye); People v. Mehlberg, 618 N.E.2d 1168, 1191 n.1 (Ill. App. Ct.
1993) (noting that the state supreme court must decide whether the state will con-
tinue to recognize the Frye standard); State v. Alt, 504 N.W.2d 38, 46 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1993) (stating that Daubert's persuasive force in state may be strengthened
by the fact that state's rules of evidence are modeled after the federal rules).
284. See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
285. LoFrus & DOYLE, supra note 15, at 295-97.
286. Id. at 297-99.
287. People v. Cronin, 60 N.Y.2d 430, 432, 458 N.E.2d 351, 352, 470 N.Y.S.2d
110, 111 (1983).
288. See supra notes 73-78 and accompanying text.
289. LoFrus & DOYLE, supra note 15, at 280; see supra notes 16-21 and accom-
panying text.
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event's duration.290 Considering the fact that misidentifications
are blamed for causing the most miscarriages of justice,291 it can
hardly be said that a method for eliminating injustice caused by
ignorance or misinformation is not probative.
The second part of the argument to exclude the identifica-
tion expert is that the testimony would have an unfair prejudi-
cial effect on the jury.292 This argument is faulty. Because they
feel that their assessment of a witness's credibility is largely
based on common sense, jurors place less weight on the identifi-
cation expert's testimony.293 Because most jurors consider
themselves to be "amateur psychologists," cross-examination of
the expert can be easy and effective due to what the jurors be-
lieve to be "common sense" subject matter.294
There are also various methods for controlling the effect of
expert testimony. Usually, the identification expert will only
testify to the general studies and results of the field of memory
and perception, such as the phenomenon of "unconscious trans-
ference." 295 The expert may also be precluded from commenting
on the accuracy of specific identifications in the case. 296 Fur-
ther, the court can instruct the jury that the ultimate decision
of the defendant's guilt is theirs, even regarding their accept-
ance of the expert testimony.297 Finally, the expert can be cross-
examined and contradicted by other experts if required. 298
Thus, the jury's role as the ultimate fact-finder is not
prejudiced, but is instead maintained and enhanced by the
presence of the expert and an appropriate limiting methodology
by the court.
In New York, however, the courts still have not distilled
their approach toward this exceedingly important expert sub-
ject matter.29 9 Given its opportunity to provide guidance in the
290. See supra notes 28-30, 35-40 and accompanying text.
291. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
292. LoFTus & DOYLE, supra note 15, at 297-99.
293. Id. at 281-82.
294. Id. (citing Charles L. Convis, Testifying About Testimony: Perceptual and
Memory Factors Affecting the Credibility of Testimony, 21 DuQ. L. REV. 579, 584
(1983)).
295. See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
296. See supra notes 172-74 and accompanying text.
297. LoFTus & DOYLE, supra note 15, at 298.
298. Id.
299. See supra notes 186-263 and accompanying text.
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area, the New York Court of Appeals did not act.300 Ironically,
by taking the "hands-off' approach, the Mooney court may have
affected subsequent lower court decisions more than it had
anticipated.
While the early decision of People v. Brown301 reflected the
common arguments against admissibility,30 2 People v. Brooks303
revealed the appropriate responses to those concerns. 30 4 Unfor-
tunately, though, the decision in People v. Schor3°5 included lan-
guage indicating an unwillingness to accept expert
identification testimony.30 6 By claiming that only victims of
sexual crimes can make mistaken identifications, 307 the court,
in Schor, revealed its ignorance of the subject. Certainly, the
cases and studies have shown that misidentifications occur in
all types of circumstances, including simple robbery.308 Inter-
estingly, the decisions in People v. Lewis30 9 and People v. Beck-
ford3 10 established a continued line of acceptance of expert
identification testimony. The use of words like "extensive"311
and "essential"312 to describe the identification expert's subject
matter indicated the emerging acceptance. This seemed an ap-
propriate time for the highest court in the state to give some
sort of endorsement of the field.
The New York Court of Appeals, in Mooney, decided not to
comment.313 Judge Kaye's strong dissent suggested that the ef-
fect of "[t]he court's cursory treatment of [the] defendant's claim
300. See supra notes 235-48 and accompanying text.
301. 117 Misc. 2d 587, 459 N.Y.S.2d 227 (Westchester County Ct. 1983); see
supra notes 191-97 and accompanying text.
302. See supra notes 195-97 and accompanying text.
303. 128 Misc. 2d 608, 490 N.Y.S.2d 692 (Westchester County Ct. 1985); see
supra notes 198-205 and accompanying text.
304. See supra notes 201-05 and accompanying text.
305. 135 Misc. 2d 636, 516 N.Y.S.2d 436 (Dist. Ct. Nassau County 1987); see
supra notes 206-14 and accompanying text.
306. See supra notes 211-14 and accompanying text.
307. See supra notes 213-14 and accompanying text.
308. See supra notes 14-78 and accompanying text.
309. 137 Misc. 2d 84, 520 N.Y.S.2d 125 (Monroe County Ct. 1987); see supra
notes 215-25 and accompanying text.
310. 141 Misc. 2d 71, 532 N.Y.S.2d 462 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1988); see
supra notes 226-31 and accompanying text.
311. See supra note 221 and accompanying text.
312. See supra note 230 and accompanying text.
313. See supra notes 235-48 and accompanying text.
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... [was] to render any right of review virtually meaningless
... [and to sanction] an unwillingness to deal realistically with
the concerns" of emerging research regarding eyewitness relia-
bility.314 While the first effect stated by Judge Kaye probably
indicated her frustration with the court's inaction at a time ripe
for judicial clarification, the court decisions following Mooney do
reveal that future courts may indeed be less willing to admit
expert testimony when they probably should.315 The reason is
apparently because a uniform method of dealing with the ad-
missibility question has not been adopted by the courts and
faulty legal reasoning still exists.
The People v. Knighton316 and People v. McCray317 decisions
indicate that arguments against admission that seemed to have
been abandoned prior to Mooney may have been resurrected by
the Court of Appeals' "hands-off' opinion. 318 Any apparent
trend by the courts toward admissibility that existed before
Mooney seems to have been stalled by that court's reluctance to
act. However, hope may lie in the People v. Wong 319 decision's
reliance on Judge Kaye's dissenting opinion in Mooney, as well
as other trial court decisions that have admitted the
testimony.320
Judge Kaye provided a framework for handling the admis-
sibility issue that could have been accepted by the majority.
She suggested that courts look to "the centrality of the identifi-
cation issue to the particular facts, the existence of other evi-
dence corroborating the identifications, the relevance of the
314. Mooney, 76 N.Y.2d at 828, 559 N.E.2d at 1275, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 116
(Kaye, J., dissenting).
315. See supra notes 249-63 and accompanying text.
316. 165 A.D.2d 904, 560 N.Y.S.2d 514 (3d Dep't 1990); see supra notes 249-54
and accompanying text.
317. 184 A.D.2d 250, 585 N.Y.S.2d 192 (1st Dep't), appeal denied, 80 N.Y.2d
906, 602 N.E.2d 240, 588 N.Y.S.2d 832 (1992); see supra notes 261-63 and accom-
panying text.
318. Knighton, 165 A.D.2d at 906, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 516 (stating that the fac-
tors relating to identification reliability can be sufficiently explored on cross-exam-
ination or in the jury charge); see supra notes 253-54 and accompanying text;
McCray, 184 A.D.2d at 250, 585 N.Y.S.2d at 193 (absolving the trial court of discre-
tionary error without analyzing applicability); see supra notes 262-63 and accom-
panying text.
319. 150 Misc. 2d 554, 556-57, 568 N.Y.S.2d 1020, 1022-23 (Sup. Ct. Queens
County 1991); see supra notes 255-60 and accompanying text.
320. See cases cited supra note 259.
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proposed [expert] testimony to the specific facts... through the
trial court's power to limit the amount and type of evidence
presented."321 In other words, the factors to consider are: 1) the
importance of the identification witness to the prosecution's
case; 2) the existence of other evidence corroborating the identi-
fication; 3) the relevance of the expert's proffered testimony to
the case; and 4) the availability of other court procedures (i.e.,
barring expert opinion). The Wong court's decision to exclude
the expert testimony is less important than the court's weighing
of these factors and basing their decision on the balance.
Therefore, an understandable standard for admitting or ex-
cluding expert identification testimony is not beyond the court's
reach. Clear guidelines would provide much needed direction in
the court's decisions in this area, taking into account the cur-
rent law and science. Unfortunately, the development of such
guidelines may be hindered by a built-in social bias of the
system.322
B. Lack of Discretion
New York appellate courts may be inclined to find psycho-
logical expert testimony offered by the prosecution admissible
while choosing, in most instances, to exclude psychological ex-
pert identification testimony offered by the defense. 323 If this is
true, the decisions apparently made based on discretionary
powers are dangerously unfair. Furthermore, without clear
guidelines regarding that discretionary decision-making pro-
cess, there is no adequate check on the system.
321. Mooney, 76 N.Y.2d at 833, 559 N.E.2d at 1277, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 118
(Kaye, J., dissenting).
322. See infra notes 323-42 and accompanying text.
323. Compare People v. Taylor, 75 N.Y.2d 277, 552 N.E.2d 131, 552 N.Y.S.2d
883 (1990) (holding that expert testimony on subject of rape trauma syndrome was
admissible); People v. Gallow, 171 A.D.2d 1061, 569 N.Y.S.2d 530 (4th Dep't 1991)
(holding that admission of expert testimony concerning sexual abuse accommoda-
tion syndrome was proper); In re Donna K, 132 A.D.2d 1004, 518 N.Y.S.2d 289
(4th Dep't 1987) (holding that opinion of expert in intrafamilial child abuse syn-
drome was admissible); People v. Fisher, 73 A.D.2d 886, 424 N.Y.S.2d 197 (1st
Dep't 1980), affd, 53 N.Y.2d 907, 423 N.E.2d 53, 440 N.Y.S.2d 630 (1981) (holding
that expert testimony regarding the psychological phenomenon of repression or
blockage was admissible); People v. Reid, 123 Misc. 2d 1084, 475 N.Y.S.2d 741
(Sup. Ct. Kings County 1984) (holding that rape trauma syndrome expert admissi-
ble) with cases cited supra notes 232-63.
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Interestingly, in cases that have involved offers of psycho-
logical expert witness testimony made by the prosecution, the
New York courts have not only been receptive to admission, but
they have used the reasoning most often rejected by them in
cases involving offers of expert identification testimony for the
defense. 324 In People v. Fisher,325 for example, the First Depart-
ment held that a psychiatrist's testimony was properly admit-
ted to show that the murder witness suffered from the
psychological phenomenon of "repression" of "blockage" which
led to his inability to immediately identify the defendant as the
killer.326 The Fisher court reasoned that the psychiatrist's testi-
mony would be "helpful" in explaining a subject not commonly
understood by laypersons. 327 The court added that by limiting
the expert to speaking only generally as to the phenomenon and
not to the specific identification's reliability, the jury's function
is not usurped.328
These rationales for admission are exactly those that have
been urged by proponents of expert identification testimony.329
While rejected in cases such as People v. Knighton,330 the ratio-
nales were embraced by the Fisher court when offered by the
prosecution. In fact, the court, in Fisher, seemed to embrace the
less restrictive "helpfulness" standard for admissibility. The
dissenting opinion, in Fisher, focused on the irony of this dis-
tinction by stating that because the expert testimony was used
to buttress the witness's identification, "the prosecution may
well have created 'a very substantial likelihood of irreparable
misidentification'."331 In admitting the expert so readily in
Fisher, the court not only provided a basis for the concern of
bias against defendants, but it also may have furthered the
danger inherent in eyewitness identifications.
324. See infra notes 325-42 and accompanying text.
325. 73 A.D.2d 886, 424 N.Y.S.2d 197 (1st Dep't 1980).
326. Id. at 887-88, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 199.
327. Id.
328. Id. at 888, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 199.
329. See supra notes 292-98 and accompanying text.
330. 165 A.D.2d 904, 560 N.Y.S.2d 514 (3d Dep't 1990); see supra notes 249-54
and accompanying text.
331. Fisher, 73 A.D.2d at 892, 424 N.Y.S.2d at 204 (Bloom, J., dissenting) (ci-
tations omitted).
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In People v. Reid,332 the court held that the prosecution may
call an expert to describe the symptoms of "rape-trauma syn-
drome."333 The court rejected the defendant's claims that "rape-
trauma syndrome" was not generally accepted and that the ex-
pert testimony invades the province of the jury.334 The court
found that research since 1974 had shown that the victim's re-
sponse to rape is unique and beyond the common understanding
of laypersons. 335 Noting that in no reported case had the admis-
sion of such expert testimony been refused, the court inferred
"general acceptance" based on examination of precedent. 336 To
allay the concern for prejudice to the jury, the court provided
that proper jury instructions, limitation of the testimony and
the defendant's freedom to call his own experts will adequately
protect the system. 3 7
One has to wonder whether the Reid court would have al-
lowed an expert in eyewitness identification to be so "freely"
called by the defendant as the language suggests. While rape-
trauma syndrome may have been considered to be a "generally
accepted" field of study in 1984, the courts evidently have never
had occasion to exclude expert testimony in this field, even at
its inception. Rather, Reid revealed that the courts are quite
willing and able to put forth the same rationale for admission of
the state's expert testimony that they so readily use to reject
the defendant's identification expert testimony.
The strongest evidence that bias may exist in the system is
the fact that the New York Court of Appeals has so readily spo-
ken in a clarifying manner on the admissibility of expert psy-
chological testimony for the prosecution 338 while it failed to do
so in Mooney.339 In People v. Taylor,340 the Court of Appeals
332. 123 Misc. 2d 1084, 475 N.Y.S.2d 741 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1984).
333. Id.
334. Id. at 1085, 475 N.Y.S.2d at 742.
335. Id. at 1085-86, 475 N.Y.S.2d at 742.
336. Id. at 1087, 475 N.Y.S.2d at 7432.
337. Id.
338. See People v. Bennett, 79 N.Y.2d 464, 471-73, 593 N.E.2d 279, 283-84,
583 N.Y.S.2d 825, 826 (1992) (rape trauma syndrome); People v. Taylor, 75 N.Y.2d
277, 552 N.E.2d 131, 552 N.Y.S.2d 883 (1990) (rape trauma syndrome); People v.
Keindl, 68 N.Y.2d 410, 422-23, 502 N.E.2d 577, 583, 509 N.Y.S.2d 790, 796 (1986)
(child abuse syndrome); People v. Henson, 33 N.Y.2d 63, 73-74, 304 N.E.2d 358,
363, 349 N.Y.S.2d 657, 664 (1973) (battered child syndrome).
339. See supra notes 235-48 and accompanying text.
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held that the prosecution's expert in "rape trauma syndrome
can assist jurors in reaching a verdict by dispelling common
misconceptions about rape . . -."341 The court also provided
guidelines as to the discretionary decision of admissibility.342
The New York Court of Appeals in Mooney could have and
should have acted in the same authoritative manner as it did in
Taylor. The court should have held that the expert in the field
of memory and perception offered by the defendant is admissi-
ble because the testimony would dispel the common misconcep-
tions about the identification process and, therefore, it would
assist the jury in their truth-finding role. Alternatively, the
court should have reversed and remanded the case for a hearing
on the appropriateness of the proffered expert testimony. More
generally, guidelines should have been provided to allay the
concerns of prejudice, such as adequate limitations on admis-
sion and a requirement for a "close fit" between the testimony
and the specific facts of the case. However, that did not occur.
It seems more than possible that the court's hesitancy or unwill-
ingness to act may have been driven by an underlying social
bias against the defendant which has seeped into the state's ju-
dicial system.
IV. Conclusion
The New York courts have not lived up to their progressive
manner of adjudication in their treatment of the area of expert
identification testimony. Because misidentifications are com-
monly understood to be a leading cause of the system's miscar-
riages of justice, one would think that the New York judges
would be leaders in the utilization of methods that would help
prevent such disasters. A substantial body of research has de-
veloped over the past decade indicating that the identification
process involves phenomena well beyond most jurors' under-
standing. As a result, several states and federal courts have
appreciated the need for expert testimony in this area by admit-
ting it.
340. 75 N.Y.2d 277, 552 N.E.2d 131, 552 N.Y.S.2d 883 (1990).
341. Id. at 292, 552 N.E.2d at 138, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 890.
342. Id. at 293, 552 N.E.2d at 138, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 890 (holding that "evi-
dence of rape trauma syndrome inadmissible when it inescapably bears solely on
proving that a rape occurred .... ").
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The New York Court of Appeals should seriously consider
addressing this matter if the court is to continue in its proud
tradition of granting substantial rights to all its citizens, includ-
ing those accused of crimes. The New York trial and appellate
court decisions indicate that many judges have not kept abreast
of the scientific and legal developments in this field. In view of
the recent Daubert decision rejecting the Frye test, which has,
up to now, been embraced by New York courts, and in view of
Judge Kaye's promotion to the position of Chief Judge, the New
York Court of Appeals should revisit this subject in a serious,
responsible manner. If the court does not speak, New York citi-
zens will be left to ponder the apparent discrepancy between
the courts' willingness to allow psychologists to take the stand
for the prosecution and their apparent unwillingness to do the
same for defendants. Justice deserves more.
David M. Shofi*
* This Comment is dedicated to my parents who have always given me their
loving support. I wish to express my sincere gratitude to Professor Bennett
Gershman and Leanne Murray, without whom this Comment would not have been
completed.
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